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First Bank of Boston v. Bellottii, Corporations
Right to Political Speech
Ever since the early 1900's and the "trust busting" days of Theo-
dore Roosevelt, American government has seen the need and pos-
sessed the power to limit corporate spending on political issues
and candidates.' While the government's need to limit corporate
spending on such issues may still be present,2 the recent case of
First Bank of Boston v. Bellottii3 has seriously threatened the
government's power to limit corporate political spending. The
Court, in Bellottii, identified the possible state violation of free
speech rights by statutory limitations on corporate political
spending.4 The Court's holding granted the corporation the same
1. Theodore Roosevelt was challenged after the election of 1904, by his de-
feated opponent, Allen B. Parker, to clean up the national electoral process.
Parker reported at the hearing before the House Committee on Elections that,
"the greatest moral question that now confronts us is, shall the trusts and corpora-
tions be prevented from contributing money to control or aid in controlling elec-
tions." Hearings before the Committee on Elections, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 56, 572
(1904). Roosevelt responded by urging Congress to pass the Tillman Act, Act of
January 26, 1907 ch. 420, 34 Stat. 864, which later led to the passage of the Corrupt
Practices Act, Act of February 28, 1925 ch. 368, tit. I1, 43 Stat. 1070, which author-
ized the federal government to regulate corporate political spending, and thereby
corporate political speech.
2. Harris, The Politics of Corporate Power, Corporate Power in America 25-41
(R. Nader and M. Green eds. 1973).
3. 98 S. Ct. 1407 (1978) (A plurality (5-4) decision, Justices White, Brennan,
Marshall and Rehnquist dissenting).
4. Id. at 1413; see generally, Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money
Speech? 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005-1010 (1976) [hereinafter cited as, Is Money
Speech?] for a discussion of the free speech nature of corporate spending.
fundamental free speech right as that given to natural persons
under the fourteenth amendment. 5 In so doing, the Court demon-
strated that it will subject government limitations on corporate
speech to the strictest scrutiny, and will require that the govern-
ment show a compelling state interest before it will allow the limi-
tation.6
At stake are thirty-one state statutes limiting corporate political
spending7 and portions of the newly amended Federal Corrupt
Practices Act,8 which limits corporate spending in an attempt to
cleanse the nation's electoral process of the evils exposed by
Watergate.9
Corporate political free speech has been the subject of many le-
gal commentaries in the last two decades. The government's
power to restrict corporate speech has been linked, in these writ-
ings, to the artificial nature of the corporate "personhood."o One
of the surprises of the Bellottii case is the majority's failure to
discuss the nature of corporate "personhood" and those cases
which based approval of government limitations on the corporate
entitys' artificial nature. The Court in this instance looked to the
inherent value of the speech that was prohibited.
This note will attempt to explain the reasoning of the Court in
directing its attention to the speech prohibited rather than to the
person speaking, and will assert that the holding in Bellottii
5. 98 S. Ct. at 1417, 1418.
6. Id. at 1421.
7. Id. at 1430 (White dissenting). See, Library of Congress, Analysis of Fed-
eral and State Campaign Finance Laws-Summaries (1977). 18 of these states pro-
hibit or limit corporate contributions in respect to ballot questions like that in
Bellottii. For a chart of states limiting corporate contributions, see, National As-
soc. of Atty. General Legislation Concerning the Corruption of Public Officials, 17
(LEAA 1974).
8. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 2 U.S.C. § 4416. See Buckley v. Valeo, 429
U.S. 1 (1976) where the Court struck down the limitations upon individual expend-
itures as being impermissibly restrictive of the right of individuals to speak their
mind. If, therefore, through Bellottii the corporation possesses free speech rights
identical to the individual, then limitations within the Corrupt Practices Act, on
corporate expenditures may also be unconsitutional.
9. See, Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corporate Political Contribution,
61 IowA L. REV. 545, 545-546 (1975). See also, Is Money Speech?, supra note 4; Com-
ment, The Constitutionality of the Federal Ban on Corporate and Union Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures, 42 U. CHL L. REV. 148 (1974).
10. See e.g. Id.; Fletcher, Corporate Political Contributions, 29 Bus. LAw 1071,
1088-89 (1974); Lambert, Corporate Political Spending and Campaign Finance, 40
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033, 1060 (1965); CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAw ENDs:
THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR, 3 (1975) hereinafter cited as
STONE; Comment, Control of Corporate and Union Political Expenditures: A Con-
stitutional Analysis, 27 FORDHAM L. REV. 599 (1959); Comment, Corporate Political
Affairs Program, 70 YALE L.J. 821, 833 (1961); Cf., King, Corporate Political Spend-
ing and the First Amendment, 23 U. Prrr. L. REV. 847 (1962). Cf. also Corporate
Contributions to Ballot-Measure Campaigns, 6 U.M.J. REF. 781 (1973).
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should be limited to the particular facts of that case.1 '
I. BELLO2rII'S FACTUAL SEITrING
Bellottii was a case involving the alleged unconstitutionality of
a Massachusetts' statute12 that forbade certain expenditures by
banks and business corporations for the purpose of influencing
votes on certain state referendum proposals.' 3 Corporate expend-
itures were prohibited if the referendum issue was one that did
not "materially affect any of the property, assets, or business of
the corporation."' 4 One referendum issue, in particular, was sin-
gled out by the statute as being outside the business purposes of
the corporation and any vote influencing expenditures were,
therefore, illegal. The specific issue in question concerned the
amendment of the Massachusetts Constitution to allow for a per-
sonal graduated income tax.' 5 The Massachusetts statute de-
clared:
No question submitted to the voters solely concerning the taxation of the
income, property or transactions of individuals shall be deemed materially
to affect the property, business or assets of the corporation. No person
... shall solicit or receive from such corporation . . .any gift, payment,
expenditure, contribution... for any such purpose.
16
The statute imposed a fine of not more than 50,000 dollars on the
violating corporation and a fine of not more than 10,000 dollars
and/or imprisonment of not more than a year for any director or
agent of the corporation violating the statute.' 7
Perhaps the essentialreason of the Court in Bellottii, that Mas-
sachusetts could not limit corporate speech on this or any other
referendum issue, is found in the history and circumstances sur-
rounding the Massachusetts statute (hereinafter referred to as
section eight). Section eight was the result of the Massachusetts
11. In an attempt to sufficiently limit the analysis of Bellottii to provide some
concrete value in exchange for the reader's efforts, this note will focus primarily
on the weaknesses of the Court's opinion, especially with respect to its concept of
corporate personhood. It will not, however, extensively cover other less essential
issues also found in Bellottii concerning: distinctions between corporate contribu-
tions and expenditures (see generally, Buckley v. Valeo, 429 U.S. 1 (1976)), issues
raising the commercial speech problems and cases (98 Sup. Ct. 1419), or issues
concerning the free speech rights of the corporate press (98 Sup. Ct. 1418).
12. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 55, § 8 (West Supp. 1978-79).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. 98 S. Ct. at 1411.
legislature's repeated attempts to amend the state constitution to
provide for a personal graduated income tax. The predecessor of
section eight,' 8 was first challenged in the case of Lustwerk v. Ly-
tron, Inc. 19 The former statute did not dictate that questions con-
cerning the taxation of individuals could not satisfy the
"materially affecting business" requirement of the statute. 20 In
Lustwerk, the court construed the prior statute to allow expendi-
tures by corporations urging voters to reject the proposed consti-
tutional amendment concerning the graduated income tax.
21
Subsequently, the statute was twice amended to specifically
prohibit corporate spending on the graduated income tax referen-
dum issue.22 It was the second amendment which led to the
Bellottii case.
As a result of this factual background, the majority could hardly
overlook the exertion of governmental influence against an idea
or viewpoint that opposed that of the state legislature. The state's
action was viewed as an effective imposition of a "prior restraint"
on speech that opposed the graduated income tax. Limitations by
the state in the nature of a "prior restraint" have been tradition-
ally viewed with greater disfavor than any other limitation on
speech. The Court was, thus, compelled to find that the state's ac-
tion violated the first amendment rights of the corporation, as in-
corporated through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.23
UTMOST PROTECTION GIVEN TO CORPORATE POLITICAL SPEECH
The factual setting of Bellottii caused the Court to frame the
main issue in the case differently than did the Massachusetts
court.24 The Court stated:
The court below framed the principal question in this case as whether and
to what extent corporations have First Amendment rights. We believe
that the court posed the wrong question. Instead, the question must be
whether § 8 abridges expression that the First Amendment was meant to
protect.2 5
This statement of the issue disregarded the lower court's discus-
sion of the corporate "personhood" which had centered on
whether the corporation has first amendment rights, and if so, the
18. Mass. Gen. L. ch. 55, § 77 (as amended by 1946 Mass. Acts, ch. 537, § 10).
19. 344 Mass. 647, 183 N.E. 2d 871 (1962).
20. 98 S. Ct. at 1412 n.3.
21. Id.
22. 1972 Mass. Acts ch. 958; 1975 Mass. Acts ch. 151, § 1.
23. 98 S. Ct. at 1415, 1416; See, Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB., 648 (1955).
24. First Bank of Boston v. Attorney General, 359 N.E.2d at 1262, 1270 (1976).
25. 98 S. Ct. at 1415.
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extent of such rights. The Supreme Court instead focused on the
question of whether the speech involved was the type of speech
"indispensible to decisionmaking in a democracy," in holding that
the "inherent worth" of certain speech does not depend upon the
identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union or
individual.26
It is essential to note that at this point that the Court's empha-
sis on the "informational" nature of the speech involved seems to
be based in part upon the first amendment philosophy of the re-
nowned constitutional scholar, Dr. Meiklejohn.27 Dr. Meiklejohn's
views on the first amendment will be reviewed here inasmuch as
they are instructive in understanding the Court's position and the
philosophy underlying first amendment rights.
Though he does not view the first amendment as an absolute
prohibition on all governmental limitations on speech,28 Dr.
Meiklejohn does emphasize that the place and manner of speech
are the primary areas of governing power allowed to government
regulators. 29 The emphasis is, therefore, on the type of speech
and when and where it is appropriate rather than on the source of
the speech. When, as in Bellottii, the place and manner of speak-
ing is of "governing importance" then the speech is accorded the
utmost protection.30
Speech of "governing importance" is by definition that speech
which is essential to a democratic form of government: the dis-
cussion of political issues and candidates. It is this type of
speech, Meiklejohn argues, with which the framers were con-
cerned in drafting the first amendment. The people granted cer-
tain powers to government and reserved others to themselves.3 '
Speech in the political forum is of such primary and "governing
importance" that it could not be entrusted to government and
was, hence, reserved to the people in the Bill of Rights.
26. Id. at 1416.
27. See, Meiklejohn, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION To SELF-GOVERNMENT
(1st Ed. 1948) See, Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation
of the First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1965) hereinafter cited as Bren-
nan; See, Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is An Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245
hereinafter cited as, An Absolute.
28. Brennan supra note 26, at 11.
29. Id. at 11-13.
30. The Court does not agree with Meiklejohn that speech of "governing im-
portance" should be absolutely protected but it did find that the speech needed
maximum protection.
31. An Absolute, supra note 26, at 254.
The majority, in Bellottii, emphasized the decision-making
value inherent in political speech, and denied government the
power to regulate this type of speech. The Court reasoned that
the people had never given government the power to regulate
such speech and without such a grant government, thus, lacks the
ability to regulate it.32
This writer has placed special emphasis on the phrase the
people in order to point out what may be a flaw in the Court's
reasoning, particularly concerning its stress on the inherent value
of the specific type of speech involved without consideration of its
source. It is not clear from Meiklejohn's discussion of the power
reserved to the people, whether the corporation is one of the
people. Meiklejohn, apparently, does not address the issue
whether the government's incapacity to regulate political speech
extends only as far as to natural persons and not to corporate
persons.
This distinction reveals the difficulty in viewing political free
speech rights as being a power denied to the government without
examining whether the people also reserved the power and right
of political speech to and for the corporation. Meiklejohn's dis-
cussion of the freedom of political thought and communication
suggests that a corporation may not have the same rights as those
reserved to individuals. He states:
The preceding section discussing the rights and powers reserved to the
people may be summed up thus: The First Amendment does not protect a
'freedom to speak.' It protects the freedom of those activities of thoughts
and communication by which we 'govern.' It is concerned, not with a pri-
vate right, but with a public power, or governmental responsibility.
In the specific language of the Constitution, the governing activities of
the people appear only in terms of casting a ballot. But in the deeper
meaning of the Constitution, voting is merely the external expression of a
wide and diverse number of activities by means of which citizens attempt
to meet the responsibilities of making judgments, which that freedom to
govern lays upon them. That freedom implies and requires what we call
'dignity of the individual.' Self-government can exist only insofar as the
voters acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion
to the general welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to ex-
press. The citizens understanding, evaluating, and deciding of political is-
sues are the activities to whose freedom the first amendment gives
unqualified protection.33 (Emphasis added.)
The justification for an absolute right to speak on issues of "gov-
erning importance" lies in the governing responsibilities reserved
to the individual. The make up of the individual citizen-voter, his
"intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to gen-
eral welfare," mandates that he be at least the primary user of
the reserved power and right to speak politically. Whether or not
32. Id.
33. Id. at 255.
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the corporation, as an entity, possesses the same attributes that
justify the power to speak politically will be discussed later in
this paper.
LIBERTY VS. PROPERTY RIGHT
The Massachusetts Attorney General had argued before the
state court that the corporation could not claim first amendment
free speech rights from among the liberties protected in the four-
teenth amendment. Rather, he asserted that the nature of a cor-
poration is such that it must derive its speech rights from the
property language in the fourteenth amendment. This distinction
in the source of the corporate speech rights between the liberty
and property language in the fourteenth amendment, though not
crucial to the Massachusetts court's finding, does present a
unique and compelling argument. The Attorney General rea-
soned that a corporation's right to speak is protected only when
its property or business rights are affected. This emphasis on
right of speech as a means of preserving and protecting the
property rights of the corporation is derived from an understand-
ing that the "personhood" of a corporation came into existence
only because of its business purposes and only to enhance the
property and business needs of the shareholders. If a corporation
speaks on matters other than its property rights, its speech could
be protected only by fourteenth amendment liberty rights which
the Massachusetts Attorney General argued the corporation does
not possess. 34
The Supreme Court, in focusing on the "speech protected" in-
stead of on the "person protected," summarily dispensed with the
argument of the state. The Court saw no value in distinguishing
the source of speech rights (in property or liberty) based on the
corporate or individual nature of the holder. Free speech had tra-
ditionally been regarded as a fundamental liberty, safeguarded by
the due process clause,3 5 and the Court declined to identify corpo-
rate speech rights in accordance with their property-protecting
function.36
It must be noted that the majority's failure to find a different
source of corporate free speech rights was most likely influenced
34. 98 S. Ct. at 1417.
35. Id. at 1417.
36. Id. at 1416-1417.
by the factual setting peculiar to Bellottii. The Court, apparently
recalling the repeated attempts of the state legislature to change
the state constitution, again emphasized:
The "materially affecting" requirement of § 8 is not an identification of the
boundaries of corporate speech etched by the Constitution itself. Rather,
it amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on
the identity of the interests that spokesmen may represent in public de-
bate over controversial issues.
3 7
The Supreme Court's finding of a corporate free speech right
protected by the "liberty" clause of the fourteenth amendment,
led it to use a different test to judge the validity of section eight
than was used by the state court. The Supreme Court used the
"exacting scrutiny" test instead of the balancing test employed by
the state court and found it necessary for the state to show a com-
pelling interest in the limitation of corporate political speech
before it could prohibit such speech.38 The Court held, "Espe-
cially, where, as here a prohibition is directed at speech itself, and
the speech is intimately related to the process of governing, the
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest
which is compelling."39 After a finding that the "strict scrutiny"
test was the standard to be applied, the state's interest was likely
to lack a sufficiently compelling nature to justify the limitations.40
The state of Massachusetts had postulated two interests in ref-
erendums aimed at preventing corporate speech. The first was
the interest of the state in "preserving the integrity of the electo-
ral process" and in "sustaining the active role of the individual
citizen," thereby preventing the diminution of public confidence
in government. 41 Though the Court recognized that these inter-
ests were of the highest importance, it found that the state had
not sustained the burden of showing that corporate advocacy im-
minently threatened the democratic process. 42
The state's second interest, that of protecting the corporate
shareholders, was also found to be less than compelling in the
light of the Court's exacting scrutiny.43 The Court found section
37. Id. at 1420.
38. Id. at 1421.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1426. Strict scrutiny requires that the state statute in question must
not only be justified by a compelling state interest, but that the statute must be
the least onerous means of achieving that interest. See, Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1122 (1969).
41. 98 S. Ct. at 1422-23.
42. Id. at 1423. But see, Harris, The Politics of Corporate Power, CORPORATE
POWER IN AMERICA 25-41 (R. Nader and M. Green eds. 1973). See also Polsby,
Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of Political Speech, 1976 S. CT.- REV. 1, 1-14
which discusses the need for governmental limitations on speech, at the federal
level.
43. 98 S. Ct. at 1424-1425.
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eight to be too narrow and, at the same time, too broad to achieve
its purported purpose of shareholder protection. The statute was
found to be underinclusive (too narrow) inasmuch as other orga-
nizations, such as labor unions and other unincorporated associa-
tions, with unprotected dissenting interests were not similarly
excluded from making referendum contributions." The statute
was found to be overinclusive (too broad) inasmuch as it out-
lawed all corporate expenditures, even where every shareholder
supported the proposed corporate speech.45 Since the Court eyed
these faults with such "exacting scrutiny" and because of the na-
ture and importance of the free speech rights protected, the state
statute was held to be ill-designed in serving the state's interest
in protecting the shareholders. The Court therefore found the
statute in violation of the corporation's free speech rights.46
It is important to note that the Court, in examining the over and
underinclusiveness of the statute, was strongly influenced, once
again, by the factual setting of section eight. The Court reempha-
sized, "The fact that a particular kind of ballot question has been
singled out for special treatment undermines the likelihood of a
genuine state interest in protecting shareholders. It suggests in-
stead that the legislature may have been concerned with silencing
corporations on a particular subject."47
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
The Court's concern with the Massachusetts' improper motives
in enacting section eight led it to announce principles concerning
corporate rights that are contrary to a general understanding of a
corporation's personhood.48 The Court's decision overestimates
the significance of the corporate personhood and thereby under-
estimates the state's interest in protecting the free speech rights
of the dissenting shareholders in the corporation.49 Had the legis-
lative history of section eight been different, the nature of corpo-
rate speech might have been examined more carefully. For
example, had section eight come before the Supreme Court at an
earlier point in time, when the statute consisted only of the "ma-
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1425.
46. Id. at 1426.
47. Id. at 1425.
48. See supra note 9.
49. 98 S. Ct. at 1430-31, 1434 (dissenting opinion).
terially affecting business" limitation on corporate speech, rather
than when it was freighted with the provision against corporate
expenditures on the particular referendum issue of personal grad-
uated income tax, the Court could have focused on the speech of
the corporation without being prejudiced by the fear of what it
saw as government censorship of certain political ideas.
A close examination of corporate speech outside the factual set-
ting of Bellottii should cause the ruling in Bellottii to be limited
to its facts. This is so for two overlapping reasons. The first is
that the nature of corporate personhood is such that it should not
be given the same free speech liberties as those accorded individ-
uals.50 The corporation as a "person" lacks the essential qualities
that give rise to free speech rights in areas that do not materially
affect its business purposes.5l In an earlier case, Chief Justice
Marshall noted that, "It is clear that the communications of profit
making corporations are not an integral part of the development
of ideas, of mental exploration and of the affirmation of self. They
do not represent the manifestation of individual freedom of
choice."52
By reframing the question before the Court, the majority side-
stepped this discussion of the underlying justification for the pro-
tection of free speech; that is, that the individual's emotional,
political, social, philosophical makeup necessitates the freedom to
50. See, Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs 203 U.S. 243, 255 (1906). Ini-
tially, corporations were held out not to be entitled to exercise the liberties of
speech and press accorded natural persons. See, Hague v. Committee for Indus.
Organizations, 307 U.S. 496, 514, 527 (1939); Comment, 66 YALE L.J. 545, 547-50
(1957); accord, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). The distinction,
however, between natural and artificial persons was weakened by later decisions,
none of which, like Bellottii, explicitly considered the corporate character of the
claimant. See, Superior Films, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954); Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952). In only one case, Grosjean v.
American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), was the applicability of the fourteenth
amendment to a corporation challenged, and there the court summarily found for
the corporation. But see, NAACP v. Alabama 357 U.S. 449 (1958), where the Court
found it necessary to sustain a New York corporation's freedom of speech on the
ground that the speech was identical with the speech of all of the corporation's
members. Alabama implies that first amendment rights of corporations are deriv-
ative of the shareholder's rights and not available to the legal entity as such, an
idea which Northwestern Nat'l had stood for, in principle, for years.
51. 98 S. Ct. at 1439-43 (Justice Rehnquist dissenting). Id. at 1431-32 (Justice
White for Brennan and Marshall, dissenting). See, T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GEN-
ERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, 4-7 (1966); See West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also, United States v. United States Brewers
Assn., 239 F. 163 (W.D. Pa. 1916) where a lower court specifically considered the
personhood of a corporation and upheld the state statute limiting its speech.
52. Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819)
quoted at 98 S. Ct. 1407, 1440.
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speak as protected by the constitution. 53 A corporation lacks
these attributes when it speaks, particularly when it speaks
outside its business purpose.5 4
A corporation is an entity whose very existence is permitted by
the state to carry on the singular business purpose of its inves-
tors.5 5 To hold that a corporation exists beyond these limits
would be to protect a group of directors in its actions as a political
body as if it represented the shareholders united emotional, polit-
ical, social, philosohical, and religious views.
In describing the personhood of a corporation, some commenta-
ries have found that the label "corporate black box" is helpful to
describe the state's justification for taxing the corporation as a
separate entity and to explain the nature of the corporation's lim-
ited liability.5 6 However, this "black box" concept or "invisibility"
must not be used to cloud the fact that the corporation exists as a
"mere creature of the law" and that it possesses only those
properties which the charter of creation confers upon it, either ex-
pressly or incidental to its very existence.5 7
These realities of the corporate makeup led dissenting Justice
Rehnquist to conclude:
Since it cannot be disputed that the mere creation of a corporation does
not invest it with all the liberties enjoyed by natural persons, United
States v. White 322 U.S. 694, 698-701 ... (1944) (corporations do not enjoy
the privilege against self-incrimination), our inquiry must seek to deter-
mine which constitutional protections are "incidental to its very exist-
ence.,,
5 8
Rehnquist went on to assert that the corporation did not possess
free speech rights identical to those of natural persons.59
The majority's holding, although purporting to make no express
statement as to the personhood of a corporation, in effect does so
53. See, T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4-7
(1966).
54. STONE, supra note 10, at 3. See, Note, Corporate Democracy and the Corpo-
rate Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L. REV. 545, 569-76 for a discussion of the ultra
vires nature of corporate political speech. But see, Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975),
where a federal statute against corporate contributions was interpreted not to
grant a private cause of action to the shareholder on the basis of the ultra vires
nature corporate contribution.
55. STONE, supra note 10, at 3. Stone writes: "After all, the corporation itself
... is a personaficta, a 'legal fiction' with 'no pants to kick or soul to damn."'
56. PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE CORPORATION IN POLrICS, (Schartz ed.
1976).
57. 98 S. Ct. at 1440 (Rehnquist's dissenting opinion).
58. Id. at 1440-41.
59. Id. at 1440-43.
by protecting a corporation's right to speak.60 The Court denies
the practical reality that a corporation, when it speaks, speaks the
views of the director, or directors, or percentage of shareholders,
using the aggregate power of the amassed corporate wealth. 61
In granting to the corporation the ability to speak on a referen-
dum issue, the Court has also given the corporation an unrepre-
sentative advantage in the political arena.62 The corporation's
limited liability, its infinite duration, and its national and interna-
tional charcter (i.e., that its shareholders can be citizens through-
out the nation and throughout the world), give to the corporation
an advantage over the natural person in deciding political is-
sues.
63
The risk of this unfair corporate political advantage was found,
by the majority, to be a necessary risk in the light of the public's
need to learn and converse in a free marketplace of ideas.64 The
Court, in effect, held that even though the corporate speech may
not be representative of the true force behind the political state-
ment, the idea should be protected and presented for public con-
sideration.65
The Court failed, however, to discuss the fact that to deny cor-
porate speech on an issue in no way hindered the right of natural
persons within the corporation holding such views to express
these views independently of the corporation.66 The limitation on
corporate speech would simply provide that speech on the refer-
endum issue would be motivated, on all sides, by the individual
feelings and desires of natural persons. Justice Rehnquist noted:
"All natural persons, who owe their existence to a higher sover-
eign than the Commonwealth, remain as free as before to engage
in political activity."67
60. Id. at 1439.
61. See, STONE, supra note 10, at 3.
62. See, Comment, Corporate Political Affairs Programs, 70 YALE L.J. 821-22.
63. Id. See also, 98 S. Ct. at 1441-42. But see, Lambert, Corporate Political
Spending and Campaign Finance, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1033 (1965), where Lambert
argues that corporate activity is necessary in a day when mass communication
costs are so high.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 1422-1424.
65. Id. The Court also placed great faith in "the people in our democracy...
for judging and evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments." Id. at
1424.
66. 98 S. Ct. at 1443, See also, Pipefitters Local 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385
(1972), where the Court held that voluntary contributions to a segregated fund
under the control of a union would be permissible corporate speech only if (1) it
was segregated from other union dues and assessments, and (2) it was funded by
noncoercive solicitations. Id. at 414. It would seem reasonable that the Court
would demand the same of the corporation's political contributions.
67. 98 S. Ct. at 1443.
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SHAREHOLDERS ARE UNPROTECTED
Closely related to a better understanding of the corporate per-
sonhood is a second reason for limiting Bellottii to its facts. Not
only did the majority fail to consider the realities of the corporate
personhood, it also appeared to ignore the free speech rights of
the shareholders within the corporation.68
Dissenting Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, pointed out
that since corporate free speech rights are not identical to those
of the individual 69 the Court should not confuse or override con-
sideratons for the shareholders in the corporation. 70 The dissent-
ers felt that the state should possess the power to limit this lesser
type of free speech, especially when protecting other fundamental
rights.71 Thus, the dissenter's emphasis was not specifically on
the personhood of the corporation, but was instead on the power
of the state to balance the competing rights involved in the limita-
tions on corporate speech.72 The dissenters felt that strict scru-
tiny was too strong a test to be applied to the state's actions
inasmuch as those actions were motivated by a concern for the
competing rights.
A key, however, to an understanding of the balancing done by
the dissent, is their shift in focus from the speech prohibited, to
the persons speaking.73 Justice White, for the dissent, wrote:
Any communication of ideas, and consequently any expenditure of funds
which makes the communication possible, it can be argued, furthers the
purpose of the first amendment. This proposition does not establish, how-
ever, that the right of the general public to receive communications
financed by means of corporate expenditures is of the same dimension as
that to hear other forms of expression.
74
This shift in emphasis to the practical nature of the corporate per-
68. See, Note, Corporate Democracy and the Political Contribution, 61 IOWA L.
REV. 545, for an extensive discussion of shareholder's rights against the corpora-
tion for the corporation's political speech.
69. 98 S. Ct. at 1430-31. White writes that corporate communication "is not fun-
gible with communications emanating from individuals and is subject to restric-
tions which individual expression is not."
70. 98 S. Ct. at 1431.
71. Id. at 1434-35.
72. Id. at 1438.
73. Id. at 1431. Inherent in a realization of other competing shareholder rights
within a corporation, is a realization that the nature of corporate personhood is
different from that of an individual. "Indeed, what some have considered to be the
principle function of the First Amendment, the use of communication as a means
of self-expression, self-realization, and self-fulfillment is not at all furthered by
corporate speech." Id. (Justice White dissenting).
74. 98 S. Ct. at 1432.
sonhood points up the numerous competing free speech rights of
the shareholders. The corporation's speech therefore amounts to
the compulsion of a contribution from all these competing view
points. 75 Such compelled contributions were found by the dissent
to raise free speech questions of the utmost gravity.7 6 White anal-
ogized to Supreme Court cases involving the compulsion of con-
tributions in public unions where such compulsion was found to
be unconstitutional 7 7 White reasoned that, although, in Bellottii,
the contribution was compelled by a private corporation and
therefore did not constitute state action (an important element of
those cases), the state had a sufficient interest in prohibiting in-
terference with member/shareholder speech, whether contribu-
tions were compelled by a public union, school, or private
corporation. 78
AN ALTERNATIVE
The Court had another alternative available by which to elimi-
nate any prior restraint on speech and yet keep intact the state's
power to limit corporate speech. The Court could have struck
down, as unconsitutional, only a part of the Massachusetts statute
without affecting the correct understanding of corporate speech
rights. By excising that part of the statute which defined taxation
of individuals as immaterial to the property, business or assets of
a corporation, 79 the Court could have focused on the improper
legislative intent to which it had so often alluded throughout the
decision, without distorting the constitutional limits of corporate
speech. Left intact would have been the state's power to regulate
corporate speech which was unrepresentative, unfair, and irre-
sponsible to the shareholder and the individual citizen.
CONCLUSION
The Bellottii Court may have overreacted to the factual back-
ground of the Massachusetts statute in the articulation of broad
principles concerning corporate speech. The Court has thereby
significantly impaired the power of the state and federal govern-
ment to check the unwieldy power of the corporate machine. In
granting to the corporation full free speech rights, the Court failed
to recognize the limitations on the fictitious personhood of a cor-
poration and also failed to protect the shareholders from depriva-
75. Id. at 1435.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1435-57, see, Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
78. Id. at 1437.
79. See, note 16, supra and accompanying text.
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tion of their free speech rights. In so doing, the Court has
effectively granted to the corporation those first amendment free
speech rights previously reserved solely for individuals.
PAUL J. ZWIER

